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Abstract
In emerging markets, the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between
controlling owners and minority shareholders. Conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards
of directors and takeovers are typically weak in containing the agency problem. This study examines
whether external independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to
alleviate the agency conflict.  Using a broad sample of firms from eight East Asian economies, we
document that firms are more likely to employ Big Five auditors when they are more subject to the agency
problem imbedded in their ultimate ownership structure. One possible reason that this documented relation
between auditor choice and the agency problem is more evident than the inconsistent results using U.S. and
U.K. data is that alternative governance mechanisms are limited in East Asia.  In addition, among East
Asian auditees subject to the agency problem, Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit
modification threshold while non-Big Five auditors do not.  Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big
Five auditors in emerging markets do have a corporate governance role.
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Non-technical Summary
Since the 1997 financial crisis, East Asian governments and international
organizations have made efforts to reform corporate governance.  Notwithstanding
new laws and regulations, theory suggests that entrepreneurs requiring external capital
would have incentives to mitigate their agency problems by introducing monitoring
and/or bonding mechanisms.  They would voluntarily tie their hands when the
expected benefit of the external financing exceeds the expected gain from
expropriating outside investors.  In particular, the entrepreneurs may voluntarily
employ reputation intermediaries to assure outside investors about their credibility.  In
this paper, we investigate whether independent external auditors can serve a corporate
governance role by testifying the quality of accounting information.  The appointment
of quality auditors serves as an assurance to the investors that the companies’
financial disclosures would be accurate and truthful.  The assurance is credible
because the auditors, with their reputation at stake, will closely scrutinize their clients’
books and truthfully disclose their findings.
However, whether or not East Asian auditors in practice fulfill the quality
assurance role and hence mitigate the agency problem has been a subject of debate.
On the one hand, compared with external auditors in the U.S. and U.K., auditors in
East Asia potentially have a stronger governance role because East Asian legal
systems and the other conventional corporate control systems are weaker in protecting
investors.  This is supported by the fact that in East Asia, with the presence of Big
Five accounting firms and other international firms, the market for external auditors isWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
much more vibrant than the market for takeovers or independent directors.  On the
other hand, the relationship-based transactions and the under-development of the
domestic accounting profession in East Asia may have considerably reduced the
demand and supply of quality audits. Evidence in a United Nations report calls into
question if East Asian external auditors actually serve as monitors. The report queries
why many external auditors had issued clean auditing opinions to clients that later
went bankrupt within a few months after the completion of the audits at the Asian
Financial Crisis.
To test whether external auditors perform a governance role, we use a broad
sample of East Asian firms to first examine if firms that are more subject to agency
conflicts hire “name-brand” (Big Five) auditors.  Big Five auditors have international
reputations and are generally perceived to be more independent than local auditors. If
Big Five auditors provide better quality assurance, the demand for their services
should increase in response to clients’ agency problems.  In contrast, the opposing
hypothesis suggests that a firm’s choice of auditor is insensitive to its agency
problems; a firm may even avoid hiring a Big Five auditor to reduce external
monitoring.
To further examine the governance role of East Asian auditors, we investigate
if they take into account firms’ agency conflicts when making audit pricing and audit
opinion decisions.  If auditors provide assurance of quality through their superior
reputations or if they exert efforts to mitigate agency conflicts, these additional
services would be reflected in the audit fee. Thus, we test if ceteris paribus auditors
charge a premium in response to agency problem.  Finally, we test if poor earnings
would more likely trigger East Asian auditors to issue modified opinions to firms
subject to large agency problems than to those subject to small agency problems. TheWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
loss exposure associated with firms’ agency problems per se may be insignificant, but
it will be magnified when the firms are in financial distress. Thus, if auditors provide
quality assurance, they will consider the increased risk exposure associated with the
agency problems and thus give more modified opinions to poorly performing clients
with large agency problems.
We find that in East Asia, firms subject to large agency conflicts, indicated by
their high control concentration and a large separation of control and ownership, are
more likely to hire Big Five auditors than firms less subject to agency problem.  We
further find that the auditee’s ownership structure is associated with its choice of
auditor only among small and high-risk auditees, whose threat of expropriation by
ultimate owners is high, but not among large and low risk auditors whose threat of
expropriation is low. Our results also show that Big Five auditors take into
consideration their auditees’ ownership structure when making pricing and opinion
decisions, while non-Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors
charge clients with controlling owners who enjoy effective control but actually own a
small stake in the firm a premium. Lastly, we document that poor earnings can more
likely trigger a modified opinion about Big Five clients with large agency problems,
which suggests that Big Five auditors lower the modification threshold as their
clients’ agency problems increase.  The overall evidence lends support to the agency
theory and suggests that auditors play a crucial monitoring role to mitigate agency
problems in emerging markets.
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking the
corporate ownership structure with mandatory external audits in the context of
emerging markets.  It provides evidence of how agency conflicts between majority
and minority shareholders affect the choice of auditors, and the auditing fees andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
auditing opinions of the auditor.  Auditor types, fees and opinions provide
quantifiable measures of the quality of this corporate governance mechanism.  From
the policy perspective, this study sheds light on the question of whether voluntary
governance mechanisms were at work prior to the Asian Financial Crisis.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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1. Introduction
Agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their concentrated
ownership structure.  Tight control creates entrenchment problem: controlling owners’ corporate
decisions, when against the interests of minority shareholders, are not easily contestable by
internal and external control systems, i.e., boards of directors and takeover markets, respectively.
Moreover, the controlling owners often leverage up their control by means of stock pyramids and
cross shareholdings.
1  The separation of control (voting rights) from ownership (cash flow rights)
exacerbates the controlling owners’ incentive to hold up minority shareholders.  However, the
companies and the controlling owners ultimately have to bear the cost: their shares would be
traded at discounts as outside investors anticipate the agency problem (Claessens et al.,
forthcoming; La Porta et al., 2000).  The agency problem has also been attributed as a key factor
that exacerbated the stock market declines in East Asia during the 1997 financial crisis (Johnson
et al., 2000; Mitton, 2001; Lemmon and Lins, 2001).
Since the financial crisis, East Asian governments and international organizations (World
Bank and International Monetary Fund) have made efforts to reform corporate governance.
Notwithstanding new laws and regulations, theory suggests that entrepreneurs requiring external
capital would have incentives to mitigate their agency problems by introducing monitoring
and/or bonding mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  They would voluntarily tie their
hands when the expected benefit of the external financing exceeds the expected gain from
expropriating outside investors.  In particular, the entrepreneurs may voluntarily employ
reputational intermediaries to assure outside investors about their credibility.  In this paper, we
investigate whether independent external auditors can serve a corporate governance role byWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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testifying the quality of accounting information.  The appointment of quality auditors serves as
an assurance to the investors that the companies’ financial disclosures would be accurate and
truthful.  The assurance is credible because the auditors, with their reputation at stake, will
closely scrutinize their clients’ books and truthfully disclose their findings.
We focus on the auditors’ role in safeguarding accounting information, because correct
accounting information endorsed by reputable auditors is a critical governance constraint that
limits controlling owners’ ability to steal.  On the contrary, if the auditors fail to perform, the
controlling owners would have a higher degree of freedom to manipulate accounting information
to cover up their self-dealings.
However, whether or not East Asian auditors in practice fulfill the quality assurance role
and hence mitigate the agency problem has been a subject of debate. On the one hand, compared
with external auditors in the U.S. and U.K., auditors in East Asia potentially have a stronger
governance role because East Asian legal systems and the other conventional corporate control
systems are weaker in protecting investors.  This is supported by the fact that in East Asia, with
the presence of Big Five accounting firms and other international firms, the market for external
auditors is much more vibrant than the market for takeovers or independent directors.  On the
other hand, as will be discussed further in the next section, the relationship-based transactions
and the under-development of the domestic accounting profession in East Asia may have
considerably reduced the demand and supply of quality audits. Evidence in a United Nations
report (Rahman, 1999) calls into question if East Asian external auditors actually serve as
monitors. The report queries why many external auditors had issued clean auditing opinions to
                                                                                                                                                            
1 There is a growing body of literature documenting that the separation of ownership and control is
common among public corporations around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) report such evidence for more than 600
corporations in 27 developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) report similar evidence in East Asia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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clients that later went bankrupt within a few months after the completion of the audits at the
Asian Financial Crisis.
To test whether external auditors perform a governance role, we use a broad sample of
East Asian firms to first examine if firms that are more subject to agency conflicts hire “name-
brand” (Big Five) auditors.  Big Five auditors have international reputations and are generally
perceived to be more independent than local auditors.
2  If Big Five auditors provide better quality
assurance, the demand for their services should increase in response to clients’ agency problems.
In contrast, the opposing hypothesis suggests that a firm’s choice of auditor is insensitive to its
agency problems; a firm may even avoid hiring a Big Five auditor to reduce external monitoring.
To further examine the governance role of East Asian auditors, we investigate if they take
into account firms’ agency conflicts when making audit pricing and audit opinion decisions.  If
auditors provide assurance of quality through their superior reputations or if they exert efforts to
mitigate agency conflicts, these additional services would be reflected in the audit fee. Thus, we
test if ceteris paribus auditors charge a premium in response to agency problem.  Finally, we test
if poor earnings would more likely trigger East Asian auditors to issue modified opinions to
firms subject to large agency problems than to those subject to small agency problems. The loss
exposure associated with firms’ agency problems per se may be insignificant, but it will be
magnified when the firms are in financial distress. Thus, if auditors provide quality assurance,
they will consider the increased risk exposure associated with the agency problems and thus give
more modified opinions to poorly performing clients with large agency problems.
                                                
2 Prior research such as Teoh and Wong (1993) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) has documented using
U.S. data that Big Five auditors provide better quality service than non-Big Five auditors. In Asia, there is very little
research providing direct evidence that Big Five auditors are superior. However, several studies, such as Simon,
Ramanan, and Dugar (1986), Simon, Teo, and Trompeter (1992), and DeFond, Francis, and Wong (2000), have
documented the existence of a Big Five brand-name fee premium in Hong Kong, Singapore and India, which is
consistent with prior research on U.S. firms that Big Five auditors are quality-differentiated from non-Big Five
auditors in these Asian countries.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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To proxy for the extent of the agency problem in East Asian firms, we use the controlling
owner’s control level and the extent to which the control exceeds the actual corresponding
portion of ownership.  We expect that the most serious agency problem will occur among firms
whose owners possess high degrees of control but own only small stakes in the firms.
The results suggest that external auditors do perform a governance role in East Asia. In
the choice of auditors, we find that firms are more likely to hire Big Five auditors when their
ownership structure indicates agency conflicts, i.e., when their ultimate owners possess high
control but own only small stakes in the firms.  Moreover, we find that firms with large agency
problems do not hire more non-Big Five auditors.  Further tests reveal that the relation between
auditor choice and ownership structure exists among small and high leverage firms whose
controlling owner entrenchment problem is likely to be magnified by their higher risk, but not
among large and low leverage firms whose controlling owner entrenchment problem is likely be
less acute.  Our results also show that Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit
modification threshold to auditees with larger agency problems, while non-Big Five auditors do
not.  More specifically, Big Five auditors charge a fee premium to clients with high control
concentration and large divergence of control and ownership. Also, we document that poor
earnings are more likely to trigger modified opinions for Big Five clients with larger agency
problems than those with less severe agency problems. Taken together, the evidence suggests
that Big Five auditors indeed have monitoring and bonding effects as predicted by the agency
theory.
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature, discusses the two
competing views about the governance role of auditors in East Asia, and presents ourWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample data and Section 4 reports the empirical analyses. In
Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2.  Development of hypotheses
In this section we review the literature on auditors’ role in corporate governance.  We
discuss two competing views regarding whether independent external auditors serve such a role
in East Asia.  We develop several hypotheses pertaining to how auditor choice, audit fee, and
audit opinions might reflect East Asian firms’ agency problems imbedded in their ownership
structures.
2.1. The positive view
There has been a long-standing interest in the accounting and finance literatures in
examining how firms employ monitors and bonding mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts
between firm managers and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Titman and
Truement (1986) have a model showing that an entrepreneur that has decided to bring his firm
public can choose a higher-quality auditor or investment banker to provide investors information
about the firm’s true value.  Hiring independent external auditors to assure information quality is
not a new idea though.  Using a historical perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) document
that independent audits were demanded since the days of English merchant guilds in the eleventh
century to the time when audits were required by law in the twentieth century. Not only is an
external audit valued and thus demanded in the absence of law, there is evidence that firms with
agency problems are more likely to demand external audits. Chow (1982) uses a sample of U.S.
companies from the 1926 Poor’s Industrial Manual and documents that large size firms with
high debt-equity ratios and many accounting-based debt covenants are more likely to hireWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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external auditors.  The issue of employing external audit to improve accounting information
quality has been more extensively discussed after the recent Securities Exchange Commission
pronouncement on Audit Committee Disclosure suggesting that firms that have weak corporate
governance mechanisms engage in more earnings management activities. In the U.S., managers
have incentives to manage earnings to meet earnings targets in their compensation contracts
(Healy, 1986). There has been recent research documenting that earnings management activities
are negatively associated with board independence (Klein, 2000b and Peasnell et al., 2000) and
the choice of Big Five auditors (Becker et al., 1998).
There have been several U.S. studies that examine auditor choice and the agency problem
in more recent periods when external audits were required by law (Palmrose, 1984; Simunic and
Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Eichenseher and Shield, 1989; DeFond, 1992). The
common theme of these studies is the linking of auditor choice or switches with the level and/or
changes in firm size, leverage and management ownership. These studies find that large firms
hire large and/or name-brand auditors.  They fail to find that a firm’s auditor choice is related to
agency problems as measured by management ownership and leverage.  However, Deli and
Gillan (2000) report that agency problem is relevant in the composition of audit committees in
boards of directors.  They find that the likelihood of a firm having a fully independent and active
audit committee is negatively related to managerial ownership and positively related to leverage.
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence detailing a relation between the agency
problem and auditor choice in the recent U.S. studies is that a wide spectrum of corporate
governance mechanisms exist in the U.S. that could be employed to alleviate agency conflicts.
The idea that other governance mechanisms can serve as substitutes for external auditing is
consistent with the assertion of the U.S. Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the EffectivenessWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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of Corporate Audit Committees that auditing is but one piece of the firm’s overall corporate
governance. Also, Klein (2000a) empirically documents that firms’ audit committee
independence is negatively associated with their choice of other corporate governance
mechanisms.
In contrast with U.S. and U.K. corporations that are typically diffusely owned, the
ownership and control of corporations is concentrated in East Asia. When ownership is diffuse as
in the U.S. and the U.K., agency problems stem from the conflicts of interest between managers
and shareholders. As ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains
effective control of the firm, as is the case of East Asia, the nature of agency problems shifts
away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The majority shareholders’ ability to
effectively control the firm has made conventional corporate governance mechanisms such as
corporate takeovers and board of directors ineffective in containing these controlling owners’
self-interested activities.  In this environment, independent external auditors, especially Big Five
firms that follow international auditing practice and draw on expertise internationally, could fill
this void in corporate governance and serve as a credible monitor of the controlling shareholders.
In East Asia, external auditors could perform the corporate governance role through
limiting the controlling shareholders’ ability to manipulate accounting information and hence
their ability to extract wealth from outside shareholders.  For instance, the controlling owner can
manage earnings downward to justify the low cash dividends paid to outside shareholders. The
controlling owner can profit from transactions with the firm he/she controls by manipulating
accounting numbers to influence the selling or purchase price. Also, many of these transactions
are done through a related party. Increasing the disclosure level of related-party activities couldWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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discourage such self-dealing activities.  A typical case is discussed in a recent Asian Wall Street
Journal (June 13, 2001) article concerning how the controlling owner of a Korean conglomerate
issued low cash dividends and profited from related-party transactions, and the minority
shareholders were calling for an extraordinary general meeting to elect an outside independent
auditor to monitor the controlling owner.
The corporate governance role of external auditors is frequently discussed in many recent
publications by regulators and practitioners in East Asia. For instance, the Securities Exchange
Commission of Thailand Corporate Governance Report (1999) argues that transparency is one of
the most important aspects of good corporate governance since it allows shareholders to use the
disclosed information to monitor the performance of the management. Thus, external auditors
could play an important corporate governance role by providing assurance to the accuracy and
reliability of financial statements of listed companies. Other publications such as the Asian
Corporate Governance Association research report (2000), Corporate Governance 1999 Survey
of Institutional Investors by PricewaterhouseCoopers of Singapore (1999), and the Korean
Committee on Corporate Governance report (1999) also highlight the importance of corporate
disclosure and transparency, and the role of external audit as part of good corporate governance
practice.
2.2. The negative view
We have discussed the positive view that auditors in this region could provide quality
assurance of accounting information and hence mitigate agency conflicts.  On the other hand, a
negative view argues that the lack of market demand for and the auditors’ willingness to supply
quality audits may render it impossible for external auditors to be effective monitors. On the
demand side, controlling owners may not desire to hire high quality auditors or even hire lowWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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quality auditors to reduce external monitoring.  Backman (1999) argues that auditing runs against
the general culture in Asia where business transactions are relationship based. The idea of
needing to monitor and to double-check a company’s accounts implies distrust and may lead to
open confrontation between owners and investors. Also, political rent seeking is prevalent and
highly lucrative in East Asia. Firms in this region may choose to remain opaque in order to
prevent competition and/or social sanctions.  Even if minority shareholders demand high-quality
external audits, they can always be out-voted by the controlling owner.
3  In addition, investors
may question the value of external audits because the rendered opinions by the auditors often do
not result in appropriate legal sanctions on firms in emerging markets where law enforcement is
weak. On the supply side, the lack of audit expertise and experienced professionals in the local
auditing profession weakens auditors’ ability to serve as effective monitors.
4 Also, their
monitoring role may be in conflict with their consulting activities with client firms, an issue not
unique to Asia. There has been a growing concern that the lack of disciplinary mechanisms in the
auditing profession may have weakened the independence of auditors in Asia.
5
Consistent with this view, DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000) find that as the Chinese
government made efforts to improve auditor independence, domestic firms listed in China took
                                                
3 The audit committees in East Asian Corporations are either non-existent or ineffective, which leaves
minority shareholders interests unprotected. In East Asia, only Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia view audit
committees as a feature of good corporate governance for publicly listed companies. Even if audit committees exist,
they often fail to represent the interests of minority shareholders because controlling owners dominate these
committees.
4 The number of CPAs (certified public accountants) and/or CAs (chartered accountants) as a percentage of
the population is low among East Asian countries compared with the U.S. (0.1%), Canada (0.3%), and Australia
(0.6%). Except for Hong Kong (0.2%) and Singapore (0.2%), most other East Asian countries such as Korea
(0.01%), Indonesia (0.006%), Malaysia (0.07%), the Philippines (0.02%), and Thailand  (0.008%) are significantly
below the standards of developed economies in regards to the numbers of CPAs and CAs. Schipper (2000) argues
that the lack of expertise and professionalism greatly limit the quality of auditors in developing economies.
5 In economies such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, there have been questions concerning the effectiveness of
self-regulation of the accounting profession in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis (The Hong Kong Economic
Journal, April 22, 1999; New Straits Times Press, February 16, 1997). Even in places such as Thailand where the
accounting profession is regulated by government, there have been government reports admitting that the monitoring
efforts are inadequate (Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand, 1999).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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flight from high quality to low quality auditors. They document that in 1996, the percentage of
modified opinions increased by nine fold after the promulgation of new auditing standards to
improve audit quality. However, as audit firms toughen their standards, those that provided high
quality monitoring service lost market share to low quality audit firms.
2.3. Ownership structure as a proxy for agency conflicts
We use the ownership characteristics of the East Asian firms to capture empirically the
extents of their agency problems.  Specifically, once obtaining effective control
6 of the firm, a
controlling owner can determine the profit distribution and opportunistically deprive minority
shareholders of their rights to share profits. In addition, the controlling owner often secures
effective control of the firm through complicated cross shareholdings and stock pyramids. These
arrangements enable the controlling owner to command a given level of control while
committing a less-than-equivalent ownership. This separation of control and ownership allows
controlling owner to extract wealth from the firm, receive the entire benefit, but only bear a
much smaller fraction of the cost than when there is no separation of control and ownership.  We
offer a simple pyramid structure to illustrate this point. A family owns 60% of the shares of
Company A, which in turn owns 40% of the shares of Company B. As a conservative measure,
we say that the family controls 40% of the voting power in Company B, which is the weakest
link in this chain of control rights. However, the family owns only 24% of the cash flow rights of
Company B, which is the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. Thus, the
pyramid exacerbates the agency problem in Company B because every dollar stolen from it costs
the family only 24 cents. It will cost the family 40 cents if there is no pyramid and the family’s
                                                
6 The effective control level is likely affected by the distribution of voting rights which is in turn affected
by laws, corporate charters, and ownership dispersion.  The level therefore varies across firms and economies.
However, Bradley and Kim (1985) show that tender offers are rare when incumbent owners possess more than 20
percent of voting powers.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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control level equals its ownership level at 40%. The controlling owner’s incentive to expropriate
is expected to increase with the degree of the divergence between the control and the ownership.
7
2.4. Hypotheses
The above discussion suggests that a firm’s choice of auditor may or may not affect
corporate governance in East Asia. To empirically address this question, we test if firms with
large agency problems, proxied by their controlling owners’ level of voting rights compared with
his/her cash flow rights, would have a larger demand for name-brand (Big Five) auditors who
have international reputations and are generally perceived to be more independent.  Our formal
(alternative) hypothesis is:
H1: A firm’s decision to hire a Big Five auditing firm is positively related to its ultimate owner’s
ability to obtain effective control and/or the degree to which the control exceeds ownership.
If the null is not rejected, it will mean that controlling owners who experience agency conflicts
may actually not always hire or even avoid Big Five auditors to evade monitoring.
In addition to examining how agency problems affect firms’ choice of auditors, we use
audit pricing to measure if auditors charge a fee premium for their clients’ agency problems.
Again, we use controlling owners’ level of separation of ownership and control to proxy for the
degree of agency problems. The clients’ agency problems may increase auditors’ assessment of
control risk. Assessed control risk may increase because firms with serious agency problems are
likely to have poor management integrity and weak internal controls. This increase in control
risk would translate into more audit hours or large risk fee premium, increasing the total audit
                                                
7 Several recent studies have suggested that these ownership characteristics reasonably capture the agency
problem in East Asia.  Claessens et al. (2000a) report that the divergence between control and ownership rights
reduces the value of East Asian firms, which is consistent with the existence of the agency problem.  Fan and Wong
(2000) report that the credibility of East Asian firms’ accounting information decreases with agency conflicts as
captured by the firms’ ultimate owners’ control level and the divergence between their control and ownership rights.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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fee. We therefore test if ceteris paribus East Asian auditors charge their clients who have larger
agency problems higher fees. Our formal (alternative) hypothesis is:
H2: The auditing fee charged to a firm is positively related to the firm’s ultimate owner’s ability
to obtain effective control and/or the degree to which the control exceeds ownership.
Prior studies on auditing fees have focused on examining how firm size or brand name
(Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984), industry specialization (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995;
DeFond, Francis, and Wong, 2000), and litigation risk (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Simunic
and Stein, 1996) affect auditing fees. There have been some recent studies that examine the
relation between corporate governance mechanisms and audit fees. Carcello et al. (2000)
document that a more independent, diligent, and expert board would demand for more external
audit and pay a higher audit fee. However, there may exist some underlying firm characteristics
such as management entrenchment problems that raise the demand for high quality board and
external audits, causing a spurious correlation. In another study using a sample of 67 Hong Kong
listed firms, Gul, Tsui, and Chen (1998) document that family control is associated with lower
audit fees. They interpret the result as being consistent with the view that family firms are
subject to fewer agency problems than non-family firms.  Our study specifically tests if audit
pricing is a function of the client firm’s agency conflicts between majority and minority
shareholders.
Finally, we test if low earnings are more likely to trigger modified opinions by auditors
for client firms with larger agency problems than for client firms with smaller agency problems.
There are two arguments that support this hypothesis. First, the loss exposure associated with the
client firm’s agency problems per se may be a small concern when the firm is profitable, but it
will become more serious when the firm is in financial distress. When a firm approaches itsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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terminal year, the risk of expropriation by its controlling owner increases because the expected
penalty if being detected is low. Thus, in bad times, the controlling owner is more prone to
engage in self-interested behavior.  Second, the controlling owner’s entrenchment may weaken
the ability of the firm to recover from a hit by poor performance, therefore increasing its
bankruptcy risk. Therefore, if auditors serve as external monitors and take into account the risks
associated with bankruptcy and controlling owners’ entrenchment, they will more likely give
modified opinions to poorly performing firms with large agency problems. Our formal
(alternative) hypothesis is:
H3: Poor earnings will more likely trigger auditors to issue modified opinions to firms whose
ultimate owners possess high degrees of control and achieve the control through less-than-
equivalent ownership investment.
3. Data sample
Our primary data source is Worldscope.  This database contains annual data regarding
auditor names, auditing fees, auditing opinions, and financial information for listed companies
from over 40 economies around the world.  From the database, we select sample firms from eight
East Asian economies -- Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  We select 1994 through 1996 as the period of analysis.  We do
not include the post-1996 period in our study to avoid possible structural shifts after the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis.  We also exclude pre-1994 data because there is too much missing data in
this earlier period.
We need to identify the ultimate controlling owners of each firm and what share of the
control and ownership rights they hold.  For this ownership information, we refer to dataWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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assembled in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). Their ownership database traces the
complex ownership structure and identify the ultimate controlling owners of about 3,000
publicly traded corporations in nine East Asian economies as of 1996, including the eight
economies we selected for study.  As the ownership of our sample firms is stable over the sample
period, we feel it is reasonable to merge the 1996 ownership data with the 1994-1996 audit and
financial data.
3.1. Basic statistics
As shown in Table 1, our final sample consists of 3,119 firm year observations from 1994
to 1996.  These observations all have auditor, ownership, and financial data that are required for
constructing our empirical measures. Our final sample represents 28% of all the listed companies
in the eight economies.
8  The table shows that Big Five or Big Five-affiliated auditors dominate
the auditing activities in the eight economies in our sample. Singapore has the highest percentage
of Big Five or Big Five-affiliated auditors with 88.3%, followed by Indonesia with 87.7%, Hong
Kong with 80.6%, Malaysia with 74%, Korea with 71.4%, Thailand with 65.3%, the Philippines
with 62.3% and Taiwan has the lowest percentage with 56.1%. In this paper, we do not
distinguish between Big Five auditors and Big Five-affiliated auditors. In Indonesia, Korea, the
Philippines and Thailand, foreign accounting firms are not permitted to practice without
partnering with local firms. All the Big Five auditors in these countries have joined up with large
local firms to form Big Five-affiliated firms. The local firms provide valuable business contacts
                                                
8 As in year 1996, the percentages of companies represented in our sample are 37% for Hong Kong, 47%
for Indonesia, 22% for Korea, 20% for Malaysia, 33% for the Philippines, 56% for Singapore, 13% for Taiwan and
18% for Thailand. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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while the Big Five firms provide technical expertise and their international networks of member
firms.
9
Not all the firms in Worldscope contain audit opinion information. The modified opinion
in Worldscope includes disclaimer and adverse opinions, and it does not distinguish among the
various types of modified opinion such as asset realization, litigation, and going concern.
Combining all these opinions into one should not bias in favor of our second hypothesis. In our
sample, only 2,335 firm year observations include an audit opinion. Table 2 presents the
percentage of modified opinions by economy and by year in our sample.
10 On average, only two
percent of the companies in our sample received a modified opinion. The percentage of modified
opinions is highest in 1995 and lowest in 1994. In addition, the cross-economy distribution of
modified opinions is uneven with Indonesia reporting no modified opinions, while Thailand
reported 13.3% opinions from 1994 to 1996.
Auditing fees are not mandatorily disclosed except in Hong Kong, Malaysia and
Singapore. Thus, Worldscope contains auditing fee data only for these three economies in our
sample, comprising 1,304 firm year observations. The mean and median auditing fees of the
three economies are reported in Table 3. The fee data show that Hong Kong firms spend the most
in US dollars (Panel A) and as percentage of assets (Panel B) on auditor services, while
Malaysian firms incur the lowest fees for such services.
3.2. Measuring the ultimate owners’ control and ownership levels
                                                
9 A case in point is the merger of Arthur Andersen and SyCip, Gorres, Velayo and Company (SVG) in the
Philippines. SVG was a local firm set up by Washington SyCip in Manila in 1946. During our sample period of
1994 to 1996, Arthur Andersen joined with SVG, which explains why the percentage of market share for Big Five
firms increased from 19.2% to 87.7% in the Philippines during this period.
10 For Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, the standards and format for the audit
report generally follow those of the U.S. The standards and reporting format of the audit report in Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and Singapore generally follow the international auditing guidelines.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Most prior studies of ownership structure focus on immediate ownership, which
constitutes common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions.  Immediate ownership
is not sufficient for characterizing the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms, as
these firms are often associated with complicated indirect ownership. In contrast to these prior
studies, we focus on ultimate ownership as identified in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).
For a given firm, the ultimate owners and their share of control (voting) and ownership (cash
flow) rights are identified.  To make the distinction between voting and cash flow rights, firm-
specific information on pyramid structures and cross-holdings is required.
The procedure for identifying the ultimate owners is similar to the one used by La Porta
et al. (1999).  An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who holds at least 5% of the
voting rights of the company and who is not controlled by anybody else.  To economize on the
data collection task, tracing further voting control stops at 50% and the ultimate owner’s voting
rights level is set equal to 50% once we reach this level. This ceiling is reasonable because the
ultimate owner unambiguously gains full control once 50% of the voting rights is secured.
Although a company can have more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate
owner.  With the highest level of voting rights, the largest ultimate owner is more likely than
smaller owners to be the controlling owner of the firm.
For a given firm, an ultimate owner’s voting control level is defined as the ownership
stake at the weakest link along the control chains connecting the ultimate owner and the firm.
The cash flow rights that support the control by the ultimate owner is the sum of the products of
ownership stakes of affiliated firms from each control chain identified.
Consistent with statistics reported by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Fan and
Wong (2000), East Asian corporations exhibit high levels of concentration of control in ourWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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sample: the mean level of voting rights of the ultimate owner is 27%. This is in contrast to U.S.
firms studied in most prior research, which are characterized by diffuse ownership and control.
The highest mean control concentration is found in Thailand (35%), followed by Indonesia
(34%), Hong Kong (29%), and Malaysia (28%), Singapore (27%), Taiwan (19%), and Korea
(17%). The sample mean cash flowing rights over voting rights (CV) of 87% indicates that there
is a significant degree of divergence between the two rights.  The mean CV ratios across the eight
economies in ascending order are: Indonesia (79%), Singapore (82%), Taiwan (84%), Malaysia
(86%), Hong Kong (88%), Korea (89%), the Philippines (91%) and Thailand (96%).
4. Empirical Analysis
This section reports the results of our empirical tests on the determination of auditor
choice, auditing fees, and auditing opinions.
4.1. Auditor choice
We test our first two hypotheses that a firm’s choice of auditor is related to the firm’s
ownership structure using the following pooled cross-sectional LOGIT regression model:
AUDITORit = a0 + a1 log(SIZEit) + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUPi + a4 PYRAMIDi + a5 DEVi
+ a6 CVi + a7 DEVi*CVi + a8  fixed effects + uit
where, for sample firm i and year t,
AUDITOR  = 1 when the auditor is a Big Five (including affiliated) accounting firm, and 0
otherwise;
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t;William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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LEVit  = the long-term debt divided by total assets at year t (leverage);
GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise;
PYRAMIDi = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid,
and 0 otherwise;
DEVi = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the
firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise;
CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner;
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and
economies;
uit = error term at year t.
We include total assets and leverage in the model to control for client size and risk. In
addition, GROUP and PYRAMID are used as a control for organization complexity.
11  Firms
belonging to complex corporate groups are likely to have numerous related-party transactions,
which complicate the earnings recognition and accounting consolidation processes. This is
particularly the case for firms in the top layers of pyramids that have to incorporate earnings of
their affiliated firms on the lower layers of pyramids.
12  We expect that group firms and
particularly firms in the top layers of pyramids to have a stronger demand for Big Five auditors.
The three ownership variables, DEV, CV and DEV*CV are our experimental variables.  DEV is
                                                
11 The information on pyramids is from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).  The group affiliation
information is from Claessens et al. (2000), which includes 170 large corporate groups across the eight economies.
Firms that are affiliated with small groups, i.e., outside the 170 groups, are treated as independent firms.  Firms
belonging to the same group do not always hire the same auditor, nor do they always hire auditors in the same class
(Big Five or non-Big Five).  Each group on average has four member firms (in our final sample) and hires two
distinct Big Five auditors and one non-Big Five auditor. Fifty-five of the 170 groups hire at least one Big Five
auditor and one non-Big Five auditor among their members.
12 Except for Korea where consolidation of accounts from subsidiaries is required only in supplementary
statements, all other economies in our sample require consolidation in the companies’ primary financial statements.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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economy wide median adjusted to net out economy level differences in voting control level.  To
reject the null of H1, we should find that more firms with high control (DEV=1) and/or larger
separation of control and ownership (CV<1) hire Big Five auditors. Thus, we expect that the
coefficient of DEV is positive, and the coefficients of CV and/or DEV*CV negative.
Before presenting our regression results, we compare each 1996 explanatory variable
pooled across all economies for the Big Five and the non-Big Five clients. The results presented
in Table 4 show that the control concentration and the divergence between control and ownership
rights are statistically significantly higher for Big Five clients than for non-Big Five clients based
on the t-test for means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians, supporting the alternative
of H1.  In addition, there are a higher proportion of Big Five clients belonging to corporate
groups based on the mean and median tests, suggesting that the demand for Big Five auditors is
associated with group complexity. In terms of client size, Big Five clients have larger mean and
median total assets but only the difference in mean is statistically significant. However, leverage
and the proportion of firms at the bottom of the pyramids are not statistically different between
the two groups.
Table 5 presents the LOGIT regression results estimated for the pooled sample period
from 1994 to 1996 and separately in each of the three years. Fixed effects are included in the
regressions where appropriate, but for simplicity they are not reported. The pooled time-series
results show that large firm and group firms in the upper layers of pyramids are more likely to
hire Big Five auditors. Also, DEV is positive and statistically significant, while DEV*CV is
negative and statistically significant. This supports the alternative of H1 that demand for Big
Five auditors is positively associated with the degree of agency problems as captured by the
controlling owners’ ability to command effective control and the divergence of their control andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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ownership.  Similar to the pooled time-series results, the coefficient of DEV is positive and
significant, while DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant in the 1994 and 1995
regressions. In the 1996 regression, CV is negative and significant while other ownership
variables are not statistically significant. Taking both the pooled time-series and annual
regression results together, the evidence is consistent with the alternative of H1 that East Asian
firms hire Big Five firms to mitigate their agency conflicts.
To test further the effect of agency conflicts between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders on the demand for Big Five auditors, we partition our sample by client size, profit
and leverage.  For a given ownership structure, we expect that the degree of agency conflicts is
more severe in small, low profit, or high leverage firms. The entrenchment problem of the
controlling owners is large when the expected loss from being detected is small. Controlling
owners of firms that are less established in size or are in financial distress are particularly prone
to engage in self-interested behaviors at the expense of outside investors, as their expected loss
of reputation and business is low.  To be consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we should
find that the hypothesized effects of effective control and divergence between control and
ownership rights on auditor choice stronger for small, low profit, or high leverage firms and
weaker for larger, more profitable, and low leverage firms.
Table 6 reports the pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions partitioned by client
profit, leverage, and size separately.  The sample partition is based on the within-economy three-
year medians.  For example, client firms are partitioned into the high (low) profit subgroup if
their return on assets is higher (lower) than the corresponding three-year median in the economy.
The regression presented in Table 5 is re-estimated using the high and low profit subgroups
separately. This procedure is repeated for leverage measured by total liability over total assetsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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and then for size measured by total assets. The results show that DEV is positive and significant
while DEV*CV is negative and significant in the small and the high leverage firms but not in the
large and the low leverage firms, while these results are present in both the high and the low
profit samples.  The evidence in Table 6 supports our prediction that small and high leverage
firms tend to have more severe entrenchment problems, and thus their choice of Big Five
auditors is more sensitive to their ownership structure.
13
To examine further if the reported effect of the agency problem on the demand for Big
Five auditors clusters in particular economies, we re-estimate the LOGIT regression economy by
economy.  As shown in Table 7, the ownership results are consistent with H1 in several
economies, though not clustering in any single economy. The effect of concentration of
ownership (DEV) on the demand for Big Five auditors is positive in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. The effect of CV is negative for Korea, while the joint effect of DEV and CV is
negative for Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. It is interesting to note that the
association between our measure of agency conflicts and preference for Big Five auditors is also
found in Korea, where there are only Big Five-affiliated auditors, suggesting that Big Five-
affiliated auditors also provide quality-differentiated audit to mitigate agency problems.
As a diagnostic check, we examine, economy by economy, whether the agency problem
affects the choice between non-Big Five auditors and the Big Five auditor that has the largest
market share in the economy. The market share of each Big Five auditor is computed based on
the auditor’s total number of clients divided by the number of listed firms in our sample.
14 If the
                                                
13 Another interpretation for the high leverage sample result is that banks may require their clients with
large agency problems to hire more reputable auditors to mitigate their agency problems. Since most long-term debt
in East Asia is bank debt, high leverage may be a proxy for this demand from banks.
14 We also consider Price Waterhouse, and Coopers and Lybrand as two separate firms in this analysis
because they are not yet merged into one firm during our sample period. The results of treating these two firms as
one or two separate firms are qualitatively similar.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Big Five market leader commands the best reputation in the economy, excluding Big Five non-
market leaders from our economy-by-economy regressions would increase the power of the test.
This conjecture is confirmed by our results that DEV is positive and significant in all economies
in our study but Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, while DEV*CV is negative and significant in all
the economies but Indonesia and Thailand.
15 The insignificant results in Indonesia and Thailand
are consistent with the null of H1, which suggests that their external auditors may not be
fulfilling their monitoring role in these two economies where the demand and supply of good
quality auditors are the weakest.
16
          In summary, we find that East Asian corporations whose ultimate owners possess high
voting control and have a large divergence of control and ownership rights are more likely to
employ Big Five auditors. This result supports the view that external auditors play a monitoring
and bonding role that mitigates the agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside
investors in this region. However, the economy-by-economy results indicate that choice of
auditor is insensitive to the agency problem in Indonesia and Thailand, which suggests that
external auditors fail to serve as monitors in these two economies.
4.2. Audit fee
To test our third hypothesis that the auditing fee reflects a client firm’s agency problem,
we run the following pooled time-series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression:
LAFit  = b0 + b1 log(SIZEit) + b2 ROAit +  b3 LEVit + b4 CACLit + b5 ARit + b6 INVit
                                                
15 This result also suggests that the insignificant coefficients of DEV and DEV*CV for Singapore in Table 7
are caused by the weak power of the test. Also, a firm-by-firm check reveals that among the sampled Singaporean
firms, 21 firms hire local auditors.  Of the 21 firms, 15 firms display control-ownership divergence (CV<1).
However, only 6 of the 21 firms display excess control (DEV=1) and only 3 firms display both excess control and
control-ownership divergence to the point of  serious agency conflicts.  These statistics suggest that the overall
agency problem of the firms that hire local auditors is not substantial enough to support the null of H1.
16 A possible alternative explanation is that Big Five auditors are not better in quality in Indonesia and Thailand.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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+ b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DEVi + b10 CVi + b11 DEVi*CVi
+ b12 fixed effects +  uit
where, for sample firm i and year t,
LAFit = the natural log of total auditing fees at year t;
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t;
ROAit = the net income divided by total assets at year t;
LEVit = the long-term debt divided by total assets at year t;
CACLit = the current assets divided current liabilities at year t;
ARit = the accounts receivable divided total assets at year t;
INVit = inventory divided total assets at year t; 
GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise;
PYRAMIDi = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid,
and 0 otherwise;
DEVi = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the
firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise;
CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner;
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and
economies;
uit = error term at year t.
Consistent with prior studies such as those by Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984), we use a
number of variables to control for (1) loss exposure attributable to the audit and (2) loss risk borneWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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by the auditor. The level of loss exposure is estimated by total asset size (SIZE), asset composition
as measured by the percentage of inventory and accounts receivable in total assets (INV and AR),
and organizational complexity.  The literature typically uses the number of domestic and foreign
subsidiaries as a proxy for organizational complexity.  The information is not available in
Worldscope. However, the amount of audit efforts should be associated with two of our
organizational complexity variables: corporate group membership (GROUP) and whether the firm
is on the bottom of a stock pyramid (PYRAMID). We expect the amount of consolidation work
increases when the firm belongs to a corporate group (GROUP = 1) and is on the top layers of the
stock pyramid with many subsidiaries (PYRAMID = 0). The loss risk borne by the auditor is
represented by the auditee’s liquidity ratio (CACL), debt asset ratio (LEV) and profitability (ROA).
Table 8 presents the pooled-economy and the economy-by-economy regression results for
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, where reporting of auditing fees is mandatory. Consistent
with prior research, the auditing fee is significantly and positively related to loss exposure and audit
risk. More specifically, consistent with the notion that the auditing fee is a function of the
complexity of the audit, the coefficients of auditee size, percentage of accounts receivable and
inventory in total assets, and group affiliation are positive and statistically significant in the pooled-
economy and economy-by-economy regressions, with the exception that the coefficient of INV,
which is not statistically significant for Malaysia, and the coefficient of GROUP, which is not
statistically significant for Hong Kong. In addition, audit risk as proxied by auditee’s ROA is
significantly negatively related to the auditing fee in the pooled-economy regression, as well as in
the Hong Kong and Malaysia regressions.
Consistent with H2, we find that the coefficient of DEV is positive and statistically
significant and the coefficient of DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant in the pooledWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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regression as well as in the Hong Kong and Singapore regressions.  When the pooled-economy
regression is run separately using Big Five and non-Big Five samples, the coefficient of DEV is
positive and the coefficient of DEV*CV is negative in both regressions, but the two coefficients
are significant only in the Big Five regression.  This suggests that Big Five auditors charge firms
with agency problems a premium as captured by the ownership variables, but non-Big Five
auditors do not. Thus, pooling Big Five and non-Big Five clients in our regression weakens the
ownership results.
We note that the coefficients of DEV and DEV*CV for Malaysia are statistically
significant but with opposite signs to those of Hong Kong and Singapore. This suggests that
Hong Kong and Singapore auditors charge a premium while Malaysian auditors charge a
discount, if the controlling owner of the client firm possesses effective control and has a large
divergence between control and ownership.  Regulations in the audit market may explain why
audit fees in Malaysia fail to reflect agency problems as we predicted.
17  In contrast to Hong
Kong and Singapore, where the auditor markets are more internationalized and less regulated,
Malaysia has an emerging audit market subject to fee regulations, which may give rise to the
different fee structure. There is a smaller presence of Big Five auditors in Malaysia as is evident
in our sample in which the average Big Five market share for Malaysia is 74%, which is
significantly less than Hong Kong with 80.6% and Singapore with 88.3% (Table 1). This lower
demand for quality auditors could be driven by the Malaysian government’s policies that
discourage international investors’ involvement in its stock market
18. This is consistent with the
                                                
17 Fee regulation is not uncommon in East Asia. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants set fee guidelines
for their members. The Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants also set fee guidelines based on clients’
total asset size.
18 Malaysia has a 30% limit on the total direct investment by foreign individuals and institutions in a
company. Singapore has some limits on foreign direct investment only in strategic industries, while Hong Kong
does not have any restrictions. Also, foreign securities firms can only operate as joint venture firms with local
partners in Malaysia. There is no such requirement in Hong Kong and Singapore.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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results in Table 3 that Malaysian corporations incur the least in dollar value and in percentage of
total assets of audit fees.  Also consistent with the effect of the fee regulation, we find that Big
Five auditors charge a fee premium in Hong Kong and Singapore, but not in Malaysia, which is
also documented by Simon et al. (1992).
As in the previous auditor choice analysis, we perform further regression analysis of
auditing fees using sub-samples partitioned by profit, size, and leverage.  In Table 9, we find that
the coefficient of DEV is significantly positive for low profit, small, and high leverage clients.
The coefficient of DEV*CV is significantly negative in the regressions for small and high
leverage clients.  In contrast, none of the coefficients of the ownership variables is statistically
significantly different from zero for high profit, large, or low leverage clients.  Overall, these
results are consistent with the hypothesis that auditing fee premiums reflect the degrees of
agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors.
In summary, the results from the auditing fee analysis show that in Hong Kong and
Singapore, auditors, specifically Big Five auditors, charge a premium for clients’ agency
problems as measured by their ultimate owners’ control concentration and separation of control
and ownership. This lends further support for the view that auditors play a monitoring role and
alleviate agency conflicts in East Asia.
4.3. Audit opinion
Finally, to test our last hypothesis that low earnings will more likely trigger a modified
opinion for firms with large agency problems than for firms with small agency problems, we run the
following pooled time-series cross-sectional LOGIT regression:
OPINIONit  = b0 + b1log(SIZEit) + b2ROAit +  b3LEVit + b4CACLit + b5ARit + b6INVitWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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+b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DCVi + b10  DCVi *ROAit
+ fixed effects +  uit
where, for sample firm i and year t,
OPINIONit = 1 when it is a modified opinion, and 0 otherwise;
DCVit  = 1 when the ultimate control exceed ownership rights, and 0 otherwise;
and the other variables are defined earlier.
In this analysis, we use only a dummy variable, DCV, to capture agency conflicts. As there
are totally only 49 modified opinions in the sample, employing both of the ownership variables is
implausible. We also do not include lagged opinions as independent variable because that would
further reduce the number of modified opinions in each of our sample years.
The regression results presented in Table 10 suggest that the modified opinions are
significantly negatively associated with firm profitability (ROA) for the whole sample and for both
the Big Five and non-Big Five client samples. However, the other audit risk variables, CACL and
LEV, cannot significantly explain audit opinions, with the exception that LEV is positively
associated with modified opinions in the non-Big Five regression. This is consistent with the
auditing fee results that among the audit risk variable, only ROA is significantly negatively
associated with auditing fees. The asset composition and organization complexity variables seem to
give surprising results. The coefficients of GROUP and AR are negative and statistically significant
in all three regressions, differing from prior predictions. Membership in a corporate group may
reduce the propensity for getting modified opinions if group firms manage to reduce bankruptcy risk
using related-party transactions as cross-subsidies. Also, ROA  is positively correlated with AR,
which may have induced multicollinearity between the two variables. Consistent with thisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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conjecture, when the regression is separately estimated using high and low profitability samples, a
procedure used in the auditor choice and auditing fee regressions, the coefficient of AR becomes
statistically insignificant in both samples. Finally, the coefficient of DCV*ROA is negative and
statistically significant for the whole sample and the Big Five sample regressions, but not for the
non-Big Five sample regression.
The whole sample and the Big Five sample results are consistent with H3 that low earnings
would more easily trigger a modified opinion for auditees with divergence of control and
ownership.  When taking the auditing fee and opinion results together, we find that Big Five
auditors take into consideration their auditee’s ownership structure in setting auditing prices and
issuing modified opinions, while non-Big Five auditors do not.
Since Table 2 shows that modified opinions are not evenly distributed across the
economies, we perform two diagnostic analyses. We repeat the regressions in Table 10 by
dropping Indonesia, which had no modified opinion from 1994 to 1996, and the results remain
qualitatively the same. In addition, Table 2 shows that in 1995 and 1996, there were considerably
more modified opinions in Thailand with 15 (19.7%) in 1995 and 11 (13.4%) in 1996. The
regression results in Table 10 also remain unchanged when both Indonesia and Thailand are
dropped from the sample.
In summary, the results from the auditing opinion regressions indicate that Big Five auditors
in East Asia are more stringent with clients with agency problems. This evidence corroborates
earlier fee premium results that Big Five auditors fulfill the monitoring role by exerting more
auditing efforts on firms subject to agency conflicts.
5. ConclusionWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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The concentrated ownership of East Asian corporations gives rise to conflicts of interest
between controlling owners and minority shareholders.  One big concern about containing the
controlling owners’ self-interested activities is that conventional internal and external
governance mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeover markets are typically weak
when corporate ownership is concentrated as in East Asia. To mitigate this agency problem,
theory suggests that the controlling owners may find ways to employ bonding mechanisms to
assure the minority shareholders that their interests would be protected.  We examine if external
independent auditors play this role in East Asia.
We find that in East Asia, firms subject to large agency conflicts, indicated by their high
control concentration and a large separation of control and ownership, are more likely to hire Big
Five auditors than firms less subject to agency problem.  We further find that the auditee’s
ownership structure is associated with its choice of auditor only among small and high-risk
auditees, whose threat of expropriation by ultimate owners is high, but not among large and low
risk auditors whose threat of expropriation is low. Our results also show that Big Five auditors
take into consideration their auditees’ ownership structure when making pricing and opinion
decisions, while non-Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors charge clients
with controlling owners who enjoy effective control but actually own a small stake in the firm a
premium. Lastly, we document that poor earnings can more likely trigger a modified opinion
about Big Five clients with large agency problems, which suggests that Big Five auditors lower
the modification threshold as their clients’ agency problems increase.  The overall evidence lends
support to the agency theory and suggests that auditors play a crucial monitoring role to mitigate
agency problems in emerging markets.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking the corporate
ownership structure with mandatory external audits in the context of emerging markets.  It
provides evidence of how agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders affect the
choice of auditors, and the auditing fees and auditing opinions of the auditor.  Auditor types, fees
and opinions provide quantifiable measures of the quality of this corporate governance
mechanism.  From the policy perspective, this study sheds light on the question of whether
voluntary governance mechanisms were at work prior to the Asian Financial Crisis.
Future research could examine other corporate governance mechanisms in emerging
markets.  Potential candidates could include institutional owners, financial analysts, and
prominent directors.  Such research will not only complement existing research that mostly
focuses on developed economies but also provide policy suggestions to firms and governments
in emerging markets that are striving to reform their corporate governance.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 1
Percentage of Firms That Hire Big Five or Big Five-Affiliated
Auditors by Economy And by Year
Economy 1994-1996 1994 1995 1996
Hong Kong 80.6 (525) 80.0 (100) 78.5 (208) 83.1 (217)
Indonesia 87.7 (271) 84.2 (64) 86.3 (88) 90.8 (119)
Korea (South) 71.4 (422) 72.0 (136) 72.1 (119) 70.5 (167)
Malaysia 74.0 (304) 79.4 (73) 71.7 (104) 73.0 (127)
Philippines 62.3 (127) 19.2 (9) 61.8 (47) 87.7 (71)
Singapore 88.3 (362) 85.5 (71) 88.8 (142) 89.2 (149)
Taiwan 56.1 (125) 54.8 (34) 54.4 (43) 58.5 (48)
Thailand 65.3 (209) 59.3 (51) 65.5 (76) 69.5 (82)
All Economies 75.2 (3119) 70.2 (538) 74.6 (827) 78.3 (980)
Numbers in brackets are total client numbers of Big Five or Big Five-
affiliated auditors.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 2
Percentage of Modified Opinions by Economy and by Year
Economy 1994-1996 1994 1995 1996
Hong Kong 1.80 (8) 0.00 (0) 1.08 (2) 3.33 (6)
Indonesia 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Korea (South) 0.20 (1) 0.68 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Malaysia 0.65 (2) 1.41 (1) 0.95 (1) 0.00 (0)
Philippines 4.88 (6) 7.14 (2) 4.17 (2) 4.26 (2)
Singapore 0.92 (3) 0.00 (0) 0.79 (1) 1.48 (2)
Taiwan 0.49 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 1.30 (1)
Thailand 13.33 (28) 3.85 (2) 19.74 (15) 13.41 (11)
All Economies 2.10 (49) 1.08 (6) 2.50 (21) 2.35 (22)
Absolute numbers of modified opinions are in brackets.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 3
Audit Fees by Economy And by Year
Economy 1994-1996 1994 1995 1996
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A : Fees in US Dollars (thousands)
Hong Kong 350.38 200.67 342.41 202.39 337.53 195.78 368.79 208.03
Malaysia 130.30 50.38 112.32 50.85 111.28 49.20 161.02 51.09
Singapore 206.71 132.90 196.63 119.34 193.77 124.82 227.65 145.41
All Three
Economies
243.92 138.12 227.66 131.67 232.62 135.76 266.71 146.68
Panel B : Percentage of Fees over Total Assets
Hong Kong 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09
Malaysia 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02
Singapore 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.07
All Three
Economies
0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 4
Comparison of Firm Characteristics between Big Five Clients And Non-Big Five Clients (1996)
All firms Firms
hiring big-
five
auditors
Firms
hiring local
auditors
T-statistics
for
difference
All firms Firms
hiring big-
five
auditors
Firms
hiring local
auditors
Z-statistics
for
difference
SIZE 2,079 2,224 1,552 1.94* 386 388 363 0.75
LEV 0.14 0.14 0.14 -0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 -1.35*
EV (%) 0.82 1.12 -0.28 1.80* 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44*
CV 0.87 0.86 0.89 -2.38*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.27**
GROUP 0.59 0.61 0.54 2.05** 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.07**
PYRAMID 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86
SIZE is total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars; LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets; EV is the percentage
of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm minus the median percentage of voting rights in
the corresponding economy; CV is the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner;
GROUP = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID = 1 when the client
firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise. ***, **,* denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% in two-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 5
Logit Regression Results for Auditor Choice
AUDITORit = a0 + a1 log(SIZEit) + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUPi + a4 PYRAMIDi + a5 DEVi  + a6 CVi
                       + a7 DEVi*CVi + a8  fixed effects + uit
1994-1996 1994 1995 1996
Intercept -0.11 -0.12 0.02 0.58
(-0.21) (-0.12) (0.03) (0.65)
SIZE 0.10*** 0.06 0.07 0.14***
(3.44) (0.98) (1.53) (2.86)
LEV -0.05 -0.06 -0.18 0.02
(-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.34) (0.03)
GROUP 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.08
(0.68) (-0.12) (0.42) (0.45)
PYRAMID -0.24* -0.11 -0.13 -0.48**
(-1.81) (-0.40) (-0.58) (-2.10)
DEV 1.18*** 1.39* 1.40** 0.71
(2.77) (1.67) (2.00) (0.96)
CV -0.12 0.44 0.23 -1.01*
(-0.37) (0.70) (0.41) (-1.70)
DEV*CV -1.26*** -1.73* -1.47* -0.68
(-2.67) (-1.85) (-1.91) (-0.84)
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.07
Observations 3119 760 1108 1251
Chi-square 214.78 108.77 69.92 92.58
Degree of Freedom 22 20 20 20
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural logarithm of
total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEVit  = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t;
GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1
when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEVi = 1
when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the
median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting
rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of
industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***,
**, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 6
Logit Regression Results of Auditor Choice by Profitability, Leverage, and Firm Size Partitions
AUDITORit = a0 + a1 log(SIZEit) + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUPi + a4 PYRAMIDi + a5 DEVi  + a6 CVi + a7 DEVi*CVi + a8  fixed effects + uit
Low profit firms High profit firms High leverage firms Low leverage firms Small firms Large firms
Intercept 1.20 -1.23 -0.38 -2.25** -0.57 0.64
(1.57) (-1.50) (-0.41) (-2.17) (-0.55) (0.62)
Log(ASSETS) 0.05 0.17*** 0.06 0.37*** 0.15* 0.09
(1.27) (3.30) (1.04) (5.62) (1.87) (1.54)
LEV -0.33 0.27 0.13 -3.03*** 0.30 -0.55
(-0.81) (0.65) (0.33) (-3.24) (0.79) (-1.11)
GROUP 0.13 -0.06 0.28* -0.26 -0.01 0.07
(0.91) (-0.40) (1.66) (-1.49) (-0.06) (0.50)
PYRAMID -0.52*** 0.02 -0.27 0.18 -0.15 -0.43**
(-2.80) (0.09) (-1.29) (0.78) (-0.80) (-2.24)
DEV 1.19** 1.48** 1.79*** 0.47 1.54*** 1.00
(1.99) (2.31) (2.54) (0.66) (2.51) (1.62)
CV -0.13 -0.06 0.34 -0.36 -0.30 0.02
(-0.30) (-0.11) (0.67) (-0.62) (-0.64) (0.05)
DEV*CV -1.69*** -1.23* -1.99*** -0.15 -1.63*** -1.05
(-2.53) (-1.74) (-2.54) (-0.19) (-2.38) (-1.53)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10
Observations 1574 1545 1166 1172 1530 1589
Chi-square 122.51 155.91 117.50 132.03 114.19 174.19
Degree of Freedom 22 22 22 22 22 22
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEVit  =
long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1 when the
client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEVi = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest
ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest
ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed
effects are not reported. The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year is higher than its corresponding three-year
median of the economy. The partitioning variable for profitability is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm size is
total assets. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 7
Logit Regression Results of Auditor Choice by Economy
AUDITORit = a0 + a1 log(SIZEit) + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUPi + a4 PYRAMIDi + a5 DEVi  + a6 CVi + a7 DEVi*CVi + a8  fixed effects + uit
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea (South) Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Intercept 3.57*** -0.71 -5.22*** 3.54*** -1.91 -7.14*** -0.71 -1.37
(2.35) (-0.34) (-2.90) (2.42) (-0.78) (-3.33) (-0.35) (-0.82)
Log(ASSETS) -0.14** 0.31** 0.48*** -0.08 -0.29** 0.67*** 0.11 -0.04
(-1.96) (2.10) (5.61) (-1.08) (-1.97) (4.51) (1.02) (-0.45)
LEV -0.15 0.46 0.68 0.69 1.13 -3.68*** -0.13 -0.52
(-0.15) (0.34) (1.37) (0.73) (0.62) (-2.75) (-0.08) (-0.65)
GROUP -0.61*** -0.00 -0.15 0.57** 1.01** 0.79 0.16 -0.14
(-2.52) (-0.01) (-0.63) (1.97) (2.10) (1.57) (0.52) (-0.51)
PYRAMID -1.06** 0.52 -0.48 -0.74** -0.88* -0.82 0.13 -0.38
(-1.98) (0.92) (-1.61) (-2.08) (-1.88) (-1.49) (0.25) (-0.80)
DEV 2.86*** -1.78 -1.01 7.77*** 10.24** 1.17 -4.09 0.73
(3.11) (-1.24) (-0.90) (2.77) (2.12) (0.70) (-1.60) (0.39)
CV -0.54 -1.45 -3.65*** 0.32 2.50** 2.40*** -0.77 0.95
(-0.46) (-1.03) (-3.74) (0.36) (2.00) (2.39) (-0.63) (0.73)
DEV*CV -3.34*** 2.15 1.52 -8.04*** -9.78** -2.36 3.73 -1.03
(-3.27) (1.28) (1.20) (-2.75) (-1.96) (-1.18) (1.34) (-0.53)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.32 0.10 0.12 0.08
Observations 651 309 591 411 204 410 223 320
Chi-square 54.63 27.13 90.97 39.07 96.78 44.45 29.96 26.25
Degree of Freedom 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEVit
= long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1 when the
client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEVi = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest
ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest
ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed
effects are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 8
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results of Audit Fee
              LAFit  = b0 + b1 log(SIZEit) + b2 ROAit +  b3 LEVit + b4 CACLit + b5 ARit + b6 INVit
             + b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DEVi + b10 CVi + b11 DEVi*CVi
               + b12 fixed effects +  uit
Pooled
sample
Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore Firms hiring
big-five
auditors
Firms hiring
local auditors
Intercept -2.44*** -1.67*** -4.00*** -2.99*** -2.27*** -3.08***
(-9.29) (-3.45) (-7.58) (-6.45) (-6.92) (-4.33)
Log(ASSETS) 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.64***
(39.03) (21.37) (21.59) (20.37) (31.55) (15.45)
ROA -0.75*** -0.69*** -0.84* -0.81 -1.14*** -0.26
(-4.47) (-3.80) (-1.79) (-1.57) (-5.67) (-0.61)
LEV 0.09 0.54** -0.08 0.34 0.01 0.16
(0.56) (2.01) (-0.29) (1.16) (0.04) (0.34)
CA/CL -0.03 -0.01 -0.08** 0.02 -0.03 0.10*
(-1.32) (-0.18) (-2.07) (0.55) (-1.36) (1.70)
AR/ASSETS 1.04*** 0.82*** 1.03*** 0.85*** 0.93*** 0.84**
(6.92) (3.72) (3.49) (2.99) (5.14) (2.17)
INV/ASSETS 1.01*** 1.00*** 0.40 1.45*** 1.38*** 0.07
(6.40) (4.51) (1.19) (4.76) (6.82) (0.21)
GROUP 0.11*** 0.01 0.17* 0.20** 0.14*** -0.04
(2.36) (0.10) (1.86) (2.00) (2.54) (-0.37)
PYRAMID -0.09 -0.09 0.02 -0.26*** -0.13 -0.09
(-1.52) (-0.67) (0.15) (-2.54) (-1.62) (-0.58)
DEV 0.30** 0.47* -1.02*** 0.91*** 0.40** -0.17
(1.96) (1.82) (-2.76) (2.71) (2.11) (-0.39)
CV 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.18 0.18
(1.48) (0.36) (0.58) (1.42) (0.96) (0.57)
DEV*CV -0.31* -0.47* 1.14*** -1.06*** -0.40* 0.14
(-1.78) (-1.69) (2.71) (-2.63) (-1.85) (0.29)
adjusted R2 0.68 0.54 0.64 0.56 0.67 0.74
Observations 1304 534 369 401 889 179William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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LAFit = natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at
year t; ROAit = net income divided by total assets at year t; LEVit = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t;
CACLit = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; ARit = accounts receivable divided total assets at year t;
INVit = inventory divided total assets at year t; GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group,
and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid,
and 0 otherwise; DEVi = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the
firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of
industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***, **, and
* denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 9
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results of Audit Fee by Profitability,
Leverage, and Firm Size Partitions
  LAFit  = b0 + b1 log(SIZEit) + b2 ROAit +  b3 LEVit + b4 CACLit + b5 ARit + b6 INVit
               + b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DEVi + b10 CVi + b11 DEVi*CVi
   + b12 fixed effects +  uit
Low profit
firms
High profit
firms
High
leverage
firms
Low
leverage
firms
Small firms Large firms
Intercept -2.13*** -2.53*** -2.02*** -2.96*** -2.10*** -3.07***
(-5.58) (-6.65) (-5.40) (-8.00) (-5.03) (-5.56)
Log(ASSETS) 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.56*** 0.65***
(27.34) (26.62) (26.47) (29.47) (18.01) (19.05)
ROA -0.80*** -0.48* -0.43* -1.07*** -0.48*** -1.41***
(-3.03) (-1.66) (-1.77) (-4.60) (-2.73) (-3.23)
LEV -0.26 0.74*** -0.08 -0.25 0.19 -0.22
(-1.40) (2.84) (-0.44) (-0.66) (1.05) (-0.89)
CA/CL -0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.08*** 0.04
(-0.08) (-1.26) (-1.63) (0.01) (-3.27) (1.31)
AR/ASSETS 1.50*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 1.21*** 0.46*** 1.89***
(6.75) (3.06) (2.90) (4.39) (2.65) (6.62)
INV/ASSETS 0.37 1.56*** 0.33 1.94*** 0.89*** 1.24***
(1.62) (7.17) (1.52) (7.12) (4.89) (4.26)
GROUP 0.01* 0.16*** 0.12* 0.10* 0.04 0.09
(0.08) (2.62) (1.93) (1.65) (0.72) (1.23)
PYRAMID -0.17** -0.03 -0.19** 0.03 0.01 -0.16
(-1.94) (-0.38) (-2.31) (0.32) (0.16) (-1.55)
DEV 0.38* 0.27 0.50** 0.11 0.49*** 0.06
(1.67) (1.24) (2.26) (0.50) (2.54) (0.23)
CV 0.00 0.31 0.33* 0.20 0.31 0.19
(0.02) (1.43) (1.78) (0.93) (1.62) (0.91)
DEV*CV -0.38 -0.28 -0.61*** -0.03 -0.47** -0.20
(-1.49) (-1.14) (-2.45) (-0.13) (-2.14) (-0.71)
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.73 0.67 0.56
Observations 591 713 658 646 740 564William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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LAFit = natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of
U.S. dollars at year t; ROAit = net income divided by total assets at year t; LEVit = long-term debt
divided by total assets at year t; CACLit = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; ARit =
accounts receivable divided total assets at year t;  I N V it = inventory divided total assets at year t;
GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1
when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEVi
= 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds
the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights to
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed
effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not
reported. The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year
is higher than its corresponding three-year median of the economy. The partitioning variable for
profitability is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm
size is total assets. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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Table 10
Logit Regression Results of Audit Opinion
     OPINIONit  = b0 + b1log(SIZEit) + b2ROAit +  b3LEVit + b4CACLit + b5ARit
                            + b6INVit +b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DCVi
                            + b10  DCVi *ROAit + fixed effects +  uit
Pooled sample Firms hiring
big-five auditors
Firms hiring
local auditors
Intercept -5.35*** -4.52* -5.72
(-2.68) (-1.73) (-0.67)
SIZE 0.08 0.01 -0.59
(0.56) (0.06) (-1.16)
ROA -6.73*** -6.26*** -19.98**
(-4.96) (-3.50) (-2.02)
LEV -1.11 -1.63 7.64*
(-1.23) (-1.36) (1.84)
CA/CL -0.03 -0.02 -0.10
(-0.67) (-0.43) (-0.58)
AR/ASSETS -3.94** -3.48* -4.44
(-2.30) (-1.72) (-0.84)
INV/ASSETS -0.84 0.21 3.70
(-0.62) (0.11) (1.17)
GROUP -1.00*** -1.61*** -2.37*
(-2.41) (-2.75) (-1.89)
PYRAMID 0.51 -0.19 2.81*
(0.85) (-0.24) (1.79)
DCV -0.69 0.42 -8.63
(-1.02) (0.54) (-0.17)
DCV*ROA -9.86*** -9.68*** 0.63
(-2.76) (-2.69) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06 0.14
Observations 2335 1758 577
Chi-square 173.55 115.39 96.43
Degree of Freedom 25 25 25
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001William Davidson Institute Working Paper 400
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OPINIONit = 1 when it is a modified opinion, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural
logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; ROAit = net income
divided by total assets at year t; LEVit = long-term debt divided by total assets at
year t; CACLit = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; ARit  =
accounts receivable divided total assets at year t; INVit = inventory divided total
assets at year t; GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate
group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMIDi = 1 when the client firm is in the bottom of
the pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DCVi = 1 when the ratio of cash flow rights to
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is less than 1, and 0 otherwise;  Fixed
effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar
years and economies; For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not
reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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